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Abstract—We propose considering assurance as a model man-
agement enterprise: saying that a system is safe amounts to
specifying three workflows modelling how the safety engineering
process is defined and executed, and checking their conformance.
These workflows are based on precise data modelling as in
functional block diagrams, but their distinctive feature is the
presence of relationships between the output data of a process
and its input data; hence, the name “Workflow Plus”.
A typical WF+-model comprises three layers: (i) process and
control flow, (ii) dataflow (with input-output relationships), and
(iii) argument flow or constraint derivation. Precise dataflow
modelling signifies a crucial distinction of WF+-based and GSN-
based assurance, in which the data layer is mainly implicit. We
provide a detailed comparative analysis of the two formalisms
and conclude that GSN does not fulfil its promises.
Index Terms—Assurance, Safety case, Workflow modelling and
conformance, Metamodelling
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety cases (SC) are an established approach to certifying
safety-critical systems in many domains [1]. However, the
size and complexity, and hence the cost, of a typical SC for
a modern computer-controlled system can be enormous and,
in some cases, greater than the cost of building the system
[2]. This explains the long-standing demand for tooling to
assist and automate the building and maintenance of SCs [3]–
[5]. The activity in this domain is mainly based on GSN
[6] or CAE [7] diagrams (further collectively referred to as
GSN-style diagrams), which has become a de facto standard
for documenting SCs. An OMG initiative in this direction,
the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [8], can
also be seen as an effort to standardize GSN-like notation in
MOF/UML terms.
In this paper, we report on several shortcomings of the
GSN formalism for building and maintaining SCs. We will
show that the shortcomings are the result of two main GSN’s
limititations: a) GSN conducts logical inference that (we
will show) essentially involves graph-based object-oriented
(GBOO) data, in a significantly data-simplified (and at some
points, data-ignorant) way. b) GSN manages the basic evidence
layer of the argument flow, which (we show) is also a GBOO
data enterprise, in an unstructured discrete setting leaving an
array of important relationships implicit. We demonstrate with
an example (taken from the GSN Community Standard [9])
that these drawbacks can essentially distort the argument flow
and thus create a dangerous false sense of confidence. A
significant investment of time and money into the development
of tools for GSN-style SCs may be a misguided endeavour as
GSN-based tools will suffer from the drawbacks of GSN. We
see the need for an assurance framework alternative to GSN,
which will better achieve GSN’s original focus on structure,
decomposition, and argument
We thus return to first principles by specifying a set of
requirements for a foundational framework, on which tooling
should be based. There are two obvious major requirements
necessary to reduce the cost of building and maintaining SCs.
R1) Provide support for a careful reusability analysis with
multiple reusability layers identified.
R2) Allow for an incremental approach based on extensive
and effective traceability mechanisms.
These tasks are typical for MDE, and known to be difficult,
but in the assurance context they become especially challeng-
ing due to the following challenges [10]:
C1) the heterogeneity of the artifacts to be integrated in the
safety argument flow
C2) with the need to include informal and domain-specific
artifacts, and a multitude of implicit assumptions about system
behaviour and interaction;
C3) the necessity to coordinate the functional system devel-
opment and its safety engineering.
Addressing these challenges gives rise to the following
additional requirements.
R3) Provide a unified approach to heterogeneous artifacts and
argument flow.
R4) Be easily understandable by the stakeholders to allow
for effective communication, and be easily extensible to
accommodate resulting changes from such communication.
R5) Be system-engineering friendly.
R6) Be safety-engineering friendly, including the necessity to
observe reasonable conservatism
Requirements R3-5 address challenges C1-3 resp. (and R5
actually spans across all the challenge range); we added R6 as
especially important in the domain of safety-critical systems,
where a reasonable conservatism is a forced necessity [11].
In this paper, we propose a modelling framework referred
to as Workflow+ (briefly, WF+)which meets the requirements
on the specification level and shows promising potential in
ongoing collaboration with our automotive partners. Tool im-
plementation has not started yet. The goal of the paper is to lay
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theoretical foundations for applying established MDE methods
to the assurance of safety-critical software intensive systems.
We believe that this can lead to improved rigour, conceptual
and technological clarity, and advanced tool support for both
development and assurance of such systems.
WF+ employs the idea of a process as a unifying foundation
for modelling and analysis of both cyber-physical systems and
SEPs (safety engineering processes) that include verification
and validation (V&V) of the former analysis. We refer
to the framework as WF+ due to a special feature of a
typical SEP subprocess: its output data are related to its input
data rather than disjoint from them as in the classical block
diagram setting. The name WF+ refers to both a workflow
composed from processes with input-output related data, and
the approach to SC development based on such workflows.
In the following, we describe the content of the paper and
list its technical contributions. In Sect. II, we give a formal-
ized definition of assurance based on the notions of WF+-
conformance and refinement. We are not aware of such model-
based assurance definitions in the literature. In Sect. III-IV,
we show how the WF+-method works with an example: we
take a GSN diagram from the GSN Community Standard [9],
interpret it as an SC, recover its semantics, rearrange it in
WF+-terms, and rebuild the case as WF+-conformance. We
show that the argument flow—a focal point of the GSN-
based assurance—is a data-driven enterprise (technically, the
inference of derived OCL constraints over data they span from
given OCL). This significantly differentiates WF+ from GSN,
in which data and dataflow are mainly implicit. Sect. V is a
comparative analysis of WF+ vs. GSN: it can be seen as an
evaluation of the new framework against an established one
based on the standard example. We show that the argument
flow in the example is significantly distorted—a disappointing
observation for an example residing in a popular standard
since 2011, Version 1 [6, p.5] until now in Version 2 [9,
p.14]. In Sect. VIII, we discuss how well WF+ addresses the
issues described in the empirical survey [12] and satisfy our
requirements above. Section IX is a brief overview of related
work. Sect. X concludes.
We extensively use colours in our diagrams as a visually
convenient additional way to convey semantics of diagram
elements, which is encoded by labels (specifically, UML’s
stereotypes) and shapes of elements. WF+-diagrams contain
large amounts of information and normally would span a full
page but we made them smaller than desired due to space
limitations. The accompanying technical report includes bigger
versions of these diagrams, and two additional fragment of
the material discussed in Sect. VIII but omitted due to space
limits.
II. ASSURANCE AS CONFORMANCE
In this section we introduce our general model of assurance.
A. Background
Approaches to certification of safety-critical software sys-
tems have traditionally been divided into two (overlapping)
groups: process-based and product-focused (cf. [11]). An
obvious plus of the former is the clarity and practicality
of the verification: the regulator can always check whether
everything prescribed was really executed. An obvious minus
is indirectness: if even everything prescribed was executed,
it is unclear how much it guarantees that the product as
such is safe. The situation is reversed for product-focused
assurance, which assumes that safety can be specified as
a collection of attributes such that having their measurable
values within a prescribed range can be interpreted as having
sufficient evidence that the system is safe. If such a collection
could be found, it would provide quite a direct approach to
assurance but, unfortunately, reducing safety to an a priori
defined finite collection of measurable attributes is unrealistic
for complex systems (unless magic creatures like Laplace’s
daemon are invoked). Indeed, the qualitative and quantitative
infinity of possible interactions of such a system as a modern
car with its environment (other cars, pedestrians, weather and
road conditions, and the driver) makes any hazard analysis
performed with a finite number of models and simulations
within a finite time period potentially incomplete.
Moreover, any attempt to mitigate this problem with super-
intelligent mathematical models amenable to super-powerful
analysis techniques is doomed to fail as even a perfect “proof”
of a system’s safety is necessarily carried out within some
reasoning system R (be it a logic, a math model, a set of
assumptions, or a conceptual framework), while the adequacy
of R to the reality being modeled cannot be established
within R and needs an external validation R′, for which
the story is repeated again.1 Such properties as safety are
inherently probabilistic: only if a sufficiently big number of
instances of a concrete product X is exploited for a sufficiently
long period of time in sufficiently diverse environmental
situations, can we then conclude that X is acceptably safe with
enough confidence. Unfortunately, when a new system goes
into production, neither of the above “if”s is available so that
risk and uncertainty are inherited qualities of a new system.
To manage them, classical engineering has always exercised
care, incremental innovation and a reasonable conservatism
(cf. [11]). However, the latter seems to be a difficult option at
the time of autonomous driving, smart homes, the Internet
of things and similar initiatives; we need a new approach
reconciling conservatism and novelty.
B. Main assumptions.
Our approach to assurance can be seen as an integration of
process- and product-oriented approaches. To make it doable
and conservative, we rely on process-oriented foundations,
but our notion of process includes important aspects of product
assurance by including relevant checks on product items using
predefined acceptance criteria [13].
1For example, the celebrated Gödel’s incompleteness theorem shows that
even such a poor and seemingly formalizable universe as arithmetic cannot
be formalized in a complete way.
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Figure 1. Conformance chain
Definition 1 (Main): System X is considered to be accept-
ably safe2 (for a given application A in a given environment
E) if the manufacturer’s safety engineering process, SEP,
satisfies the following two conditions:
a) SEP is acceptably-well defined for a class of systems
similar to X;
b) SEP’s definition is acceptably-well executed for X .
In other words, according to empirical evidence and expert
opinion encoded in condition a), if condition b) is satisfied for
a system X , then X is safe for application A in environment
E.
To make these general conditions technical and verifiable,
we build three WF+-models: Wf SEP that models the SEP,
Wf exeSEP(X) that specifies SEP’s execution for system X ,
and Wf Norm that models a body of normative documents
(standards, regulations, on-site manuals, expert opinion and all
relevant domain knowledge), which regulate and prescribe how
SEP is to be defined (but should give the manufacturer enough
freedom to adapt to the norm). We specify these models
as specially profiled class diagrams (we say metamodels) so
that condition a) of Def. 1 amounts to checking if meta-
model Wf SEP is a correct refinement of another (normative)
metamodel Wf Norm, and condition b) amounts to checking
conformance of an object model (instance) Wf exeSEP(X) to the
metamodel Wf SEP.
Definition 2 (Main, more formal): System X is consid-
ered to be acceptably safe if the following two conformance
conditions are satisfied:
Wf exeSEP(X) V&Vinst Wf SEP V&Vref Wf Norm (1)
where inst denotes instanceOf-relation and ref is a suitably
defined refinement relation between workflows modelled as
class diagrams. The index V&V refers to the necessity to check
both Validity of the data and Verification of the formal relation
; later we will explain how validity checks can be reduced
to another layer of syntactic verification.
Figure 1 provides some details. Workflow metamodels Wf SEP
and Wf Norm are class diagrams consisting of process classes
(i.e., classes modelling processes), data classes, and dataflow
associations, and constraints (basic and derived) that force the
required semantics of the class diagram. Refinement amounts
to having a syntactically correct mapping of the graph of
process and data classes and associations in Wf SEP to a similar
graph of Wf Norm, moreover, we require the mapping to be
compatible with the constraints. For making the definition
2The safety aspect is discussed in more detail in Sect. VI-B.
more precise and formal, finding an appropriate notion of
workflow refinement and its formalization are crucial; we leave
this for future work. As a possible starting point, we are
investigating the notion of model transformation refinement
proposed in [14]; a formal definition of mapping’s compat-
ibility with constraints can be found in [15]. Conformance
(b) is a well-known instanceOf relationship between an object
(instance) diagram and a class diagram (the metamodel) es-
tablished over a typing mapping between the graphs such that
the constraints are satisfied. We will discuss it in more detail
in Sect. IV-B
Remark 1) Workflow conformance includes not only control-
flow conformance (the primary approach in standard process-
based approaches to certification) but also data conformance,
which makes it product-based as well.
Remark 2) In principle, the refinement chain can be extended
with a deeper normative workflow Wf Metanorm regulating the
definition of normative documents.
Thus, we reformulate assurance as a combination of (semi-
)formalizable tasks, which are non-trivial, but known, partially
well-studied and amenable to (semi-)automation. Using de-
composition techniques described in [14], the conformance
checks can be done in a hierarchical way, which would make
them manageable even for very complex workflows.
III. FROM GSN TO WF+, 1: PROCESS & DATA FLOW
Figure 2 shows a GSN goal structure taken from the GSN
Community Standard [9, p.14]; we will refer to it as the (GSN)
Example. We will interpret the Example as a sketch of a simple
safety case, extract its semantic meaning and present it in WF+
terms, and then compare the two cases, as schematically shown
in Fig. 3. In more detail, we will extract from the data in the
Example a SEP definition workflow Wf SEP and show that the
argument flow of the Example can be interpreted as checking
conformance Wf exeSEP(X) V&Vinst Wf SEP where X denotes the
Control System considered in the Example. We then somewhat
artificially create a normative workflow to simulate the second
conformance check. Thus, all workflows occurring in formula
1 are extracted from the data provided by the Example.
A. Recover Semantics: GSN through workflow glasses
Even a superficial inspection of the Example’s elements
shows that they (directly or indirectly) refer to entities of
several basic types. We will consecutively introduce them
below.
1) Processes and data.: Several elements of the GSN
diagram explicitly refer to processes. For example, context
C4 mentions Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), justification
J1 mentions SIL Apportionment (SAppt), solution node Sn2
mentions FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), and goals G7, G8 talk
about Protection Systems Development (PSDev). There are
also explicit references to data, e.g., context C4 says that FHA
produces a set of hazards, and strategy S1 together with goals
G4-6 say that this set consists of three hazards, H={H1, H2,
H3}, while goals G5-6 refer to probabilities of hazards H2-H3
occurrences.
Figure 2. A safety case example from the GSN Community Standard [9, p.14]
GSN diagram 
(as a sample
safety case)
1. recover semantics
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3. Comparison 
WFC Semantics of GSN
GSN annotated 
with Proc.&Data
GSN annotated 
with logical inference 
Figure 3. From GSN to WF+
The results of such an inspection are shown in Fig. 4, where
references to processes and data are labelled by green and
orange block resp., and special data residing in normative
documents, Tolerability Targets in C3 and SIL Guidelines in
C5, are shown in grey. (In addition, the input data for the
entire SEP, i.e., the system data are shown with a darker orange
shade.) A majority of data type names (such as Tolerability
targets) are omitted and replaced by one generic name D to
keep data blocks compact. Moreover, logical data, i.e., truth
values, are special and shown by red round blocks T, which
should actually read T:Bool — we again omitted the type to
make blocks compact.
Colons in block labels show that we talk about instances of
processes and data, i.e., individual executions of processes and
individual data objects consumed and produced by processes.
For example, PSDev refers to a definition of some process
of Protection System Development, which was executed twice
(see goals G7, G8) for two hazard groups: one has SIL=4
and presumably consists of very bad hazards H1 (of SIL=4)
and H2 (of high SIL 4 or 3), the other group consists of
hazard H3 with SIL=2 (and hence the group SIL=2). Executing
process PSDev for group 1 has resulted in a primary Protection
System, pr:PS, and executing PSDev for group 2 produced a
secondary Protection System, sc:PS; the systems are specified
by different data of the same type PS. Similarly, we have two
executions of the FTA process, which provide probabilities of
hazards H2 and H3 resp., i.e., data p2 and p3 of the same type
P(robability), i.e., reals in the segment [0,1].
Note a logical error in the Example: assumption A1 is not
needed for strategy S1, but is necessary for deriving G1 from
G2 and G3 , i.e., it is a fundamental assumption of strategy
S0 justifying this derivation. To fix this error, we added a
strategy S0 and reassigned assumption A1 to S0 rather than
to S1 (these corrections are shown by red). Another way to
fix the error could be to reformulate goal G2 by erasing the
adjective “identified” from its formulation.
2) Dataflow.: The diagram in Fig. 4 presents a very poor
view of the story with all dataflow implicit. This is fixed in
Fig. 5, where process input and output flow is shown by, resp.,
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Figure 5. GSN Example annotated with data (orange/grey) and processes (green) blocks and dataflow arrows (input—orange/grey, output—green).
orange/grey and green arrows. The resulting diagram is self-
explainable except, perhaps, the three processes below goals
G4-G6 and their dataflow– we will explain them now.
Let’s begin with execution 2:FTA. This process inputs data
of the primary PS and performs FTA for hazard H2 providing
its probability p2. Then this probability is compared with a
certain normative value 10−6 (see goal G5 and the grey arrow
showing the dataflow from the Tolerability Target document,
TTD) and if p2 < 10−6, we conclude that hazard H2
is sufficiently mitigated (formally, Mit(H2)=True). Note that
while the comparison as such is a simple algebraic operation,
the conclusion about the mitigation of hazard H2 is a much
more complex process based on a nontrivial domain knowl-
edge encoded in the TTD. To model such type of argument
flow, we introduce a special type of processes (D|=?C) ⇒?
that evaluates whether some data D satisfy some constraints
C and what is a Boolean-valued consequence of such an
evaluation. We thus assume that these processes consist of
two parts: formal syntactical checking D |= C, and its safety-
related semantic consequence. Goals G5 and G6 encode two
executions of such processes resulting in truth values True
for hazards H2 and H3 (note important dataflow links to these
processes from hazards, which are assumed coupled with their
SILs provided by FHA). We have a similar workflow for
elimination of hazard H1: the formal verification procedure
as such only provides data d1, while whether these data really
show that hazard H1 has been eliminated is another issue
addressed by the respective process Elim(H1) as shown in the
diagram. For uniformity, we added some normative data (note
the grey block ?:D) intended to model the knowledge of how
verification data to be interpreted to conclude that hazard H1
is eliminated indeed.
So far, we have shown the workflow producing the truth
values in goals G4-G6, but other truth values are still isolated
and their production is not explained.
3) Reviewing.: The truth values in goals G7-8, and also in
assumption A1 and justification J1 are produced by processes
of a special type called Review. Reviewing is shown in Fig. 6
by purple round blocks labelled R. For example, to assure the
statement required by justification J1, the process SAppt is to
be reviewed, and similarly achieving goals G7 and G8 needs
reviewing the corresponding executions of PSDev. A review
R of process P (we omit colons) takes P’s execution data as
its input and outputs a Boolean value for the corresponding
proposition about P (typically, correctness and/or completeness
phrased in context dependent terms, e.g., completeness of FHA
as phrased in assumption A1).3 We have thus explained all
truth values besides the upper three assigned to the top goals
G1-3.
4) Logical inference.: The last part of the story is logical
inference: in Fig. 7, note three light-blue blocks ix:I (x=1,2,0)
residing in strategy nodes and light-blue arrows connecting
them to propositions. The inference i0 (in strategy S0) can be
3To simplify notation, we connect P and R immediately, but with an
accurate notation, there should be a data block in-between them. A detailed
workflow model of reviewing will be considered later in Sect. III-D.
specified by logical formula A1 ⇒ (G2&G3 ⇒ G1), and
similarly for the two other inferential blocks: inference i1 is
unconditional while i2 requires a side condition J1. Although
inference goes bottom-up, we show it with top-bottom arrows
following the GSN notation to reduce clutter. We also show
the truth-values produced by the inference flow rather than by
the process-dataflow in blue.
Note also that we changed the visualization of the dataflow
from process :SAppt to proceses 1:PSDev and 2:PSDev to
make it visually similar to the logical flow. We will discuss
this later.
In the next subsection, we will convert our process-data
annotations into an accurate workflow model.
B. Instance Conformance: Syntax
Process and data blocks in Fig. 7 sketch some workflow,
which in this section we treat as an instance of some workflow
definition/metamodel (Wf SEP in term of Sect. II). Making the
latter syntactically accurate and semantically reasonable needs
some domain knowledge beyond the workflow sketch in Fig. 7,
but we tried to minimize the extension beyond the Example.
We build the metamodel as a class diagram with a special
type of class stereotyped Process (green in Fig. 8), whose in-
stances are process executions. Dataflow to and from processes
is shown with directed associations, while ordinary (static)
associations between data classes (yellow and orange) are
all undirected and oriented vertically. Orange data are input
to the entire SEP process, consisting of three components,
HARA, Design, Verification (note three green rectangles in
Fig. 8), which are further decomposed as shown. The order
of processes is shown with numbers prefixing process names
(and can be inferred from the dataflow). We use rectangle
frames to show decomposition, e.g., process HARA consists
of three subprocesses. Boundary objects (circle with a vertical
line attached) are used as aliases for data to reduce the number
of crossing lines in the model, and purple elements will be
discussed later (ignore them for a while). Red notes are used
to denote constraints on data. For example, the attribute valid?
of SIL must be True. SysML-like ports are used on the sides
of classes to indicate that an attribute is produced by a process.
Attribute indentation denotes nesting (attributes of attributes)
The diagram is mainly a self-explainable completion of the
annotated Example (Fig. 7). Black-box labels loosely show
the backward mapping to the GSN diagram to illustrate how
our metamodel was derived from it. We only mention several
points. Note attribute mitORelim of class Hazard and its
multiplicity [1], which says that each hazard is to be eliminated
or mitigated but not both. If a hazard is to eliminated, then
by composing associations occursIn and protectedBy, we
obtain a derived association Elimination of multiplicity 0..1
as not each hazard is to be eliminated; similarly for hazards
to be mitigated we obtain a derived association Mitigation.
Now multiplicity [1] implied multiplicity [1] spanning the
two association ends (shown blue as it is derived) says that
each hazard is to eliminated or mitigated by exactly one PS.
The inverse multiplicity 1..* is derived from multiplicities of
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Figure 6. GSN Example annotated with data (orange/grey), processes (green) and review (violet) blocks and dataflow arrows (orange/grey, green and violet)
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green, violet and blue)
Figure 8. Metamodel further referred to as Wf SEP
protecs and consistsOf and demands a protection system to
protect against at least one hazard(this kind of association is
not essential for safety, but is useful for ensuring there are no
idle systems not protecting hazards, for example, after a design
iteration) Also, process FV in Fig. 7 is specialized as a state
space exploration, which assures hazard elimination iff the
hazardous state is not reachable. The comparisons residing in
goals G5, G6 are specified as executions of the query specified
in box 3b.2, which is defined to assure hazard mitigation.
Note a special feature of the workflow: data produced by a
process are connected to its input data, e.g.,Process 3b.1 takes
a pair (H,PS) consisting of a hazard H and a PS intended to
mitigate H, uses this data to conduct a fault tree analysis, and
outputs the Real Probability of H occuring with PS in place
as an attribute of H.
The metamodel in Fig. 8 defines a workflow, which can
be executed for any data correctly instantiating the orange
part of the diagram, and thus instantiate the yellow part of
the class diagram (commonly referred to as WorkProducts).
The GSN Example actually tells us a story about such an
instance Wf exeSEP(X) as shown in Fig. 9, where the dataflow
from (green) processes to (yellow) are omitted to avoid clutter
(ignore purple underlined circles with arrows for a while) . It
is easy to see that the instance workflow Wf exeSEP(X) satisfies
all constraints declared in the metamodel workflow Wf SEP.
C. Instance conformance: Semantic validity
In assurance, there are two main questions about instances.
The first is its syntactic correctness: whether all constraints de-
clared in the metamodel such as Wf SEP in Fig. 8 are satisfied.
This task can be done automatically with modern MDE tools.
The second question is more challenging: syntactically correct
data can be semantically invalid e.g., for instance Wf exeSEP(X),
a hazard can be missing from set Hazard.allInstances={H1,
H2, H3}, or the SIL of hazard H3 is to be 4 rather than 2 so
that hazard grouping must be changed, or if even all SILs are
valid, grouping was done incorrectly and hazard H2 is to be
grouped with H3 rather than H1, etc. In fact, a majority of
the instance elements are to be checked for semantic validity
(we will say validated), including the results of verification.
Validation of an element x in instance Wf exeSEP(X) is done
by reviewing the process that produced x, e.g., FHA for the
hazard set completeness, SIL Determination for SILs validity
etc.. Review processes (we say reviews) are denoted by purple
underlined circles in the metamodel Fig. 8; we only show three
of the total six (not seven as Query is computed automatically
and does not need reviewing). Review executions in Fig. 9 are
also purple. To simplify notation, we show the dataflow from
a process to its review by an arrow and omit the intermediate
data: this is just a syntactic sugar for a detailed specification
considered in the next subsection.
D. Reviewing as an aspect
The pattern in Fig. 9 of a process producing data followed
by a review checking the validity of that data is shown only
once but in reality is repeated in many different places in a
typical SC. Thus, reviewing appears as a typical crosscutting
concern and should be appropriately managed along the lines
developed by the aspect-oriented programming community
(AOSD), [16]. In our context, we need a mechanism of
enriching a core metamodel with an aspect metamodel (advice,
in AOSD terms) developed separately and weaved into the
core metamodel at specified points (pointcuts). We are not
aware of any AO-frameworks for metamodeling presented in
the literature, and leave development of such for future work.
Below we will use the main idea of aspect weaving [17] for
metamodel weaving in the following sense. Mmain ff wep  Mentry
[PO]
Mmain+Madv
e∗
?
ffw
∗  Madv
e
?
Figure 11. Aspect weaving
A crosscutting concern
is specified by an advice
metamodel Madv, whose part
Mentry ⊂ Madv specifies an
entry, to which the advice is to
be applied. Formally, we model
this as an embedding mapping
e : Mentry ↪→ Madv. Now,
having a main metamodel
Mmain with a set of entry points in it, for each such point ep
we specify a mapping wep : Mmain ← Mentry (see Fig. 11, in
which given metamodels are framed and given mappings are
solid, while computed mappings are dashed) and apply the
pushout operation (PO) to the pair (e, wep), which will result
in the merge Mmain + Madv modulo the common (shared)
part Mentry: thus, we have weaved Madv into Mmain (details
of how operation PO works can be found, e.g., in [18]).
In Fig. 8, three (from total six) entry points are shown with
underlined purple circles, and the advice metamodel to be
weaved with them is described in Fig. 10. It shows a very
simple example of an actual review process around the key
idea: the review observes performance data of a process, say
P , including when and how it was executed and who the
executor(s) were, alongside with the inputs and outputs of P .
The review then outputs a Boolean value that (dis)approves the
semantic validity of the critical data produced by P . What data
are to be validated, and how reviewing is to be organized, is to
be determined in the normative documents and be accordingly
implemented in SEP.
IV. FROM GSN TO WF+, 2: ARGUMENT FLOW
In Sect. IV-A, we show how the data-driven inference
mechanism of WF+ works We will try to follow the argument
flow of the Example as much as possible, but be forced to
deviate from it: the argument flow in the Example does not
match its data flow, whereas our formal data-driven inference
procedure forces the former flow to follow the latter. We
discuss the discrepancy in Sect. V after we show how inference
on the level of metamodel interacts with their instances in
Sect. IV-B.
A. Data-driven logical inference
The WF+-based inference is described by Fig. 12. It shows
the metamodel Wf SEP, in which green process blocks are
omitted to save space (but implicitly are there) but aliases (in
Figure 9. An WF+-instance further referred as Wf exeSEP
fact, entry points) of all six review processes are shown (in pur-
ple). There are several changes in the representation of the data
part. We introduce an abstract reified association hzProtection
(generalizing associations Elimination and Mitigation (whose
lines are omitted to avoid clutter), and derive from multiplic-
ities for attribute mitORelim and associations Containment
and grProtection (see Fig. 8) that association hzProtection is
composed
hzProtection = Containment .. grProtection (2)
with multiplicities as shown (circled blue as they are derived).
To shorten formulas, we will abbreviate the names above
by hPr, Cnt, and gPr resp. The fact that association hPr
is composed from Cnt and gPr, is shown in the diagram
by two orange arrows from the component associations to
the composed one— this is a simple case of data derivation
(or querying). Important new elements in Fig. 7 are claims,
i.e., natural-language formulations (in the assurance parlance)
of data constraints, which are shown as notes attached to
constraints. E.g., claims A11, A21 (pink notes on the left) are
attached to encircled data constraints as shown, and claims
A12, A22 (bold red and white font) are attached to validity
constraints.
Note an important difference between pink and red claims.
Claim A11 is a simple syntactic constraint: it is violated if a
hazard H does not have a SIL (all attributes have multiplicity 1
by default) or its SIL is an integer greater than 4. Claim A12 is
a semantic requirement of the validity of SIL assignment, e.g.,
if a hazard H is assigned SIL=2 whereas it is so dangerous
that its SIL should be 4, then constraint A11 holds while claim
A12 is violated. To formalize the latter as a constraint, we
introduce SIL’s attribute valid? of type Boolean, produced by
the corresponding review process, and require the value of this
attribute to be T(rue). In GSN, conjunction of (syntactic) A11
and (semantic) A12 would typically be formulated in semantic
terms as phrased in the claim note A1.
In a similar way, we can treat claim A2 (below A1) as
conjunction of a syntactic part A21 (the pink note) phrasing
multiplicity 1 (note the dashed line), and a semantic part A22
validating whether the hazard grouping is done right w.r.t.
safety engineering guidelines. Conjunction of A1 and A2 can
be formulated as in the claim note A so that we have the
inference tree from A11, A12, A22, A21 to A as shown
Figure 10. Aspect Metamodel(Advice)
in the diagram We can identify claim A with context J1 of
the Example, more accurately, constraint A can be seen as a
formal model of (somewhat fuzzy) claim J1 (note the black
box labelled J1 attached to note A). Based on this assumption,
we somewhat arbitrarily distribute the meaning of J1 between
its subclaims (note labels 1/4 of J1).
Our seemingly pure logical work above was actually guided
by data and dataflow in the metamodel. Two orange (the data
colour) dashed lines from note A to class SIL (data element
D1(A)) and association Containment (element D2(A)) which
point to data defining the validity of claim A. The meaning of
A then guides us in finding the relevant data constraints A11
and A21, while processes that produce data D1(A), D2(A)
point to reviews needed for validation—the decomposition of
A into conjunction
∧
i≤2,j≤2Aij is data driven!
We can proceed in exactly the same way with decomposition
of claim GP (below claim A that refers to the Apportionment
part of the story while GP stands for the GroupProtection part).
We will mention briefly several points. The semantic claim
GP2 is formulated in parallel to goal G2 in the example, and
the name of the semantic validity attribute is changed from
the common valid? to a special name following the Example’s
context C5. Then we infer GP⇐GP1 & GP2 and HC⇐A &
GP, where HC (HazardCoverage) is a claim about the com-
Figure 12. Argument flow(X# refers to the type for element X in Fig. 2)
posed association hPr (note the orange link). We also know
that the SEP requires to verify all hazard coverage links (which
instantiate association hPr). Verification processes evaluate
attributes ver? (whose Truth is required by corresponding pink
constraints), which are then validated by reviews evaluating
attributes valid? (with red Truth constraints). We thus have an
inference tree for claim CV as shown in the diagram. Next
we assume that having a coverage link H-PS between hazard
H and system PS (an instance of hPr) verified and validated
means that system PS does protect against H. We then derive
claim HP. Finally, assuming hazard analysis completeness HI,
we derive the top safety claim SS as shown.
B. Constraint derivation: From metamodels to instances
Constraints are elements of metamodels, and their derivation
lives on the metamodel level while a typical GSN case builds
an argument flow for a concrete system, i.e., an instance. The
gap is bridged by the soundness of our derivation steps: we
derive semantically rather than by syntactic rules. In more
detail, suppose we have a metamodel M = (GM ,CMgiven) with
G being its graph of classes and associations, and CMgiven a
set of constraints defined over G. An inference tree can be
schematically presented by a sequence of inference steps
CMgiven = C
0
der |=1 C1der |=2 . . . |=n Cnder = CMder 3 C!
where |=i is an inference step extending a set of derived
constraints Cider with a new constraint Ci so that C
i+1
der =
Cider ∪ {Ci}; the initial set consists of all constraints initially
given in the metamodel; and CMder is the final set containing the
top claim C!. Soundness of a step i means that for any instance
I properly typed over GM , if I |= Cider then I |= Ci+1der . By
transitivity, if I |= CMgiven and all steps are sound, then I |= C!.
Soundness of some of our derivation steps is based on sim-
ple logic, e.g., the inference CV⇐EV & MV is sound because
of the data condition hzProtection = Elimination∪Mitigation,
which is in turn implied by multiplicity 1 of Hazard’s attribute
elimORmit (see Fig. 8). Some inference steps can be seen as
merely definitions, e.g., A1⇐A11 & A12. And some deriva-
tions are semantically non-trivial, e.g., when we conclude
that having a coverage link H-PS both verified and reviewed
implies that PS really protects against H. A common approach
to such derivations is to require strong validation criteria so
that getting equality valid?=T for an instance I is not easy but
being achieved would indeed mean that the semantic condition
in question is satisfied.
Thus, for a given system X , if Wf exeSEP(X) |= CWf SEPgiven , then
Wf exeSEP(X) |= C! so that the B) part of an WF+-based safety
case (see Def. 1) consists of two major subparts:
(B1) Constraint derivation over the SEP metamodel,
C
Wf SEP
given |= C!, and
(B2) Checking instance conformance, Wf exeSEP(X) |=
C
Wf SEP
given , for a given system X , whose most challenging part is
checking T for validity constraints (shown in red in Fig. ??).
V. WF+ VS. GSN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
We will begin with a brief survey of how we processed the
material described in the Example (further Ex.GSN) and come
to its WF+-version (Ex.WF+) to set a stage for the discussion,
then present the results of comparing Ex.GSN and Ex.WF+,
and conclude with some general observations about GSN.
A. From Ex.GSN to Ex.WF+: Defining the DCC
We recognize that the main goal of the Ex.GSN diagram
was to demonstrate the vocabulary of GSN elements and to
show how they can usefully be put together rather than
write an SC per se. To do this, the authors of the document
chose to specify in GSN terms an oversimplified SC, which
is a justifiable and reasonable choice: GSN is widely used
for building and documenting SCs in many domains. The
Ex.GSN-authors skillfully managed to address both goals:
they described the notation and presented an interesting and
seemingly well-arranged SC within a small diagram. This
conclusion is justified by the fact that Ex.GSN has resided
in the Standard without changes for eight years now, and
motivates our idea to use Ex.GSN as a sample SC to show
how WF+ works.
Our comparative analysis needs an accurate description of
what our processing brought to Ex.GSN. As Fig. 7 shows,
Ex.GSN provides a listing of processes and data involved,
and Fig. 8 shows that we did not intoduce in Ex.WF+
new processes nor data classes (they all are labelled by the
respective elements of Ex.GSN). However, classes (green and
yellow) only give us a discrete view of the story without
the dataflow between processes and data (green-yellow links),
and associations between classes (yellow-yellow); below we
refer to both types of links as dataflow. We have restored
the missing structural links based on our understanding of
the domain knowledge (DK) and thus came to metamodel
Wf SEP in Fig. 8. As this DK is sufficiently common, it
seems reasonable to assume that the authors of Ex.GSN based
their SC on a similar dataflow picture but kept it implicit. In
addition, our WF+-glasses revealed two more actors on the
stage. The first is a set of constraints for the dataflow, and
the second one is splitting the argument flow into two parts:
(data-driven) constraint derivation over the metamodel, and
checking the instance conformance Wf exeSEP(X) inst Wf SEP
(while a typical GSN SC considers argument flow for a given
system X without mentioning the two levels).
We will refer to the differences between the two frame-
works, GSN and WF+, as to DCC (Dataflow, Constraints,
Conformance). Again, it seems reasonable to assume that all
three actors are implicitly (and perhaps inaccurately) present
in the Ex.GSN so that the only real difference between the
two frameworks is that WF+ treats DCC as first-class citizens
while GSN keeps them underground. We can schematically
write something like an equation
WF+= GSN + Explicit DCC (DCC)
Our next goal is to compare the two cases, Ex.GSN and
Ex.WF+, to see whether DCC-explication is practically im-
portant or is mainly a theoretical bonus.
B. Mapping between the two diagrams
We compare two argument flow diagrams: GSN-diagram in
Fig. 2 (referred to as Ex.GSN or “theirs”) and WF+-diagram in
Fig. 12 (Ex.WF+ or “ours”). In the latter diagram, note black
labels that map elements of Ex.WF+ to elements of Ex.GSN.
Some elements are a perfect match, e.g., our claims A and HP
are exactly their justification J1 and goal G2 resp.; the labels
can be seen as links specifying a wf2gsn-relation between the
two diagrams. With this discipline, some of our claims have
two labels, e.g., A has J1 and 1/4ofG2, where the fraction label
refers to the place of the claim in the inference tree (fraction
labels have other colouring schema to ease visualization),
which makes relation wf2gsn of one-to-many type.
Finally, several elements in the lower part of our diagram
are labelled X# to be read “the type of X” where X is a
GSN element: the latter may be an instance level datum, e.g.,
solutions Sn1 and Sn2 (as related to instance-level goals G4-
G6) while our classes Elimination and Mitigation are meta-
data to be labelled as Sn1# and Sn2# resp. Now some of
the claims in our diagram have several labels, e.g., GP2
has label 1/8ofG2 by its place in our inference tree, label
G3 as it is almost exactly Ex.GSN’s G3, labels G7#,G8#
because conformance of an instance Wf exeSEP(X) to GP2 would
correspond to Ex.GSN’s goals G7, G8 and solutions Sn3, S4
resp. Having placed all labels and hence defined the relation
wf2gsn, we can begin our comparative analysis.
Mapping wf2gsn maps claims (nodes) in the WF+-diagram
to elements/nodes in the GSN-diagram. For an ideal match
between two diagrams, we would like this mapping to be
compatible with the inference structure: if two our claims C1,
C2 are mapped to GSN-elements E1, E2, and C1 is a subclaim
of C2, then E1 should be a subclaim of E2 if they are both
claims (this is an ideal case), or at least E1 is a “subelement”
of E2 in some suitable sense, e.g., an assumption attached to a
strategy S below goal G can be seen as a subelement of G. If
the subelement relation is preserved but its depth is not, e.g.,
C1 is an immediate subclaim of C2 while E1 is a grandchild
subelement of E2 (or the other way round), it would mean that
one of the diagrams have a more detailed inference path than
the other, which would still be a good match between the two
inference trees.
Surprisingly, the mapping wf2gsn between the diagrams is
not compatible with the inference structure and actually sig-
nificantly distorts it. The most visible, and dramatic, distortion
is the clear parallel structure of the GSN-diagram which is not
the case for the WF+-diagram. In the GSN-diagram, the flow
below goal G1 splits into two parallel branches: below G2
and below G3, while in the WF+-diagram, the image of G3
is claim GP2 in the left lower part, and thus the G3-branch
is embedded into the G2-branch. Figure 13 illustrates what
happens: the dataflow specified by three bold elbow red arrows
(at the bottom) actually map the right branch of the argument
flow to the bottom of the left branch.
Another distortion is the placement of assumption A1 as
a subelement of G2 while actually it must be a subelement
of the top goal G1 in GSN-diagram: see Fig. 13, in which
we introduced a strategy S0 to which A1 actually belongs.
This displacement of A1 is logically obvious; it is surprising
that it is going unnoticed for eight years. (An alternative
way to fix the logical error could be to remove the attribute
“identified” from goal G2 formulation.) There are also smaller
discrepancies such as having context C3 in the upper part of
GSN-diagram, while its proper place is close to bottom as
shown by WF+-diagram.
Another major issue is non-distinguishing of the instance-
metamodel layers in GSN. E.g., in the GSN-diagram, having
a common Sn2 for two goals G5, G6 is correct on the level
of types (see WF+-diagram) but incorrect on the level of
instances: it may happen that FTA was executed correctly
for hazard H2 and incorrectly for H3, necessitating different
reviews and thus two executions of Sn2 as shown in our
instance diagram in Fig. 9.
C. Comparison
We will look at the mapping GSN – WF+ from the two
opposite sides.
1) WF+in the GSN view.: The GSN literature identifies
the two basic ingredients of safety assurance: deduction (the
process of deriving new claims from the elementary claims
until the top claim is reached) and evidence (that supports the
elementary claims) [19] On the level of the WF+-assurance
architecture, we can identify GSN’s deduction with the WF+-
task (B1) of constraint derivation (see the end of Sect. IV-B),
and GSN’s evidence support with WF+-task (B2): indeed,
checking an instance conformance for a typical Wf SEP ba-
sically amounts to checking non-empty instantiation of the
type graph GWf SEP that satisfies multiplicity constraints, and
then checking that all validity attributes have value T, which is
close to providing evidence in GSN. As for elementary GSN
blocks from which GSN diagrams are built (such as Goals,
Assumptions, etc.), Fig. 7 on p.9 shows that every element
of the GSN vocabulary gets its representation in WF+. Thus,
WF+ is expressive enough to model GSN on both levels: the
architecture and the atomic blocks.
2) GSN in the WF+ view.: We will begin with several
technical observations (items a), b) below), and then discuss
their general consequences in items c-g).
a) Although a GSN diagram can include processes and data
(see Fig. 4 on p.5), it does not have primitives to model
dataflow (Fig. 5). The result is that dataflow is lost (eg, as
shown by Fig. 13 on p.17) or is (mistakenly) modelled by
the argument flow: note the parallel structure of the dataflow
and logical flow over strategy S2 in Fig. 7 on p.9, which may
provoke errors.
b) GSN flattens the two-level structure of checking the SEP
execution on the elementary level (ref to the FTA thing), and
on the conceptual/architectural level of constraint derivation
(B1) and instance conformance (B2).
c) A serious consequence of the lost dataflow is the absence of
explicit traceability mechanisms (cf. discussion in Sect. VIII).
d) Flattening (item b) often hampers comprehensibility and
may lead to errors, which appeared even in our simple case
(the same solution for two hazards) and can dangerously
accumulate in large industrial safety cases.
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Figure 13. GSN Example with some logical distortions explicated.
e) The GSN approach to structuring seems ad hoc. In WF+,
the inference tree is built from claims (constraints) while
GSN’s inference involves several types of elements (note that
claims in Fig. 12 are labelled by G, A, J in a seemingly
unordered way ). Labelling in Fig. 8 shows a close relationship
between data and context, but other types also appear there.
f) While in WF+, graph-based object-oriented data drive the
inference and thus facilitate building the safety case, GSN
leaves safety case builders on their own with the problems
of proof and evidence design, which can lead to an ad hoc
inference structure as we have seen above.
g) Overall, having the DCC trio (Data-Constraints-
Conformance) explicit and formalized is a way better
for building and documenting safety cases (cf. discussion in
Sect. VIII).
VI. ASSURANCE AS CONFORMANCE, REVISITED: PARTS
AND COLOURS OF SAFETY ASSURANCE
We first argue that the CAE interpretation of the GSN
diagrams can be very much misleading. Then we recall the
results of the previous section to show how the major question
of safety assurance is answered in the WF+-fwk, and why we
need the second conformance check Wf SEP ref Wf Norm. The
last section provides some details.
A. GSN vs. CAE
GSN-inspired but WF+-realized safety case would consist
of three conceptually different parts.
Part 1. The SEP definition workflow Wf SEP, is to be pro-
vided. It includes all process and dataflow (green and orange),
including reviewing (violet) and, importantly, constraints (red)
over data and dataflow.
Part 1*. From constraints given in Part 1, new con-
straints/claims are derived (blue), and the corresponding in-
ference tree eventually results in the top safety claim.
Part 2. The SEP execution workflow for system X is to
be provided, Wf exeSEP(X), and demonstrated that the execution
conforms to the definition, Wf exeSEP(X) inst Wf SEP. Specif-
ically, the execution instance has to satisfy all given (red)
constraints (which GSN would call “the body of evidence”).
Then, by the transitive soundness of inference (see Sect. IV-B),
we conclude that the instance satisfies the top safety claim too.
Importantly, the blue inference can be seen as a “proof”
of the safety claim if only each inference step is seman-
tically sound (Sect. IV-B)— this fundamental aspect of the
argument flow is often underestimated in the GSN literature
and, we believe, in the practice of writing safety cases in the
GSN notation. Indeed, assuring soundness requires a justified
strategy assigned to each decomposition/inference step, i.e., a
strategy and its justification at each decomposition step are to
be mandatory elements of GSN-based safety cases. However,
the GSN syntax does not make a justified strategy a mandatory
element, and many safety cases appearing in practice do use
this liberty, e.g., the GSN Community example we considered
above.
Moreover, a majority of GSN decomposition steps are not
of logical nature and show a process decomposition rather than
logical inference. For example, suppose we want to provide a
more detailed evidence for the claim HI: All hazards have been
identified (see Fig. 12 on p.14) rather than just FHA reviewing.
Then we need to decompose FHA into smaller subprocesses,
then decompose the latter into smaller subroutines and so on,
and correspondingly, FHA reviewing will be composed from
more elementary reviewing acts. The result will be a refined
SEP definition, over which we can build a refined inference
tree, but the latter is actually not needed: as we have seen
in Sect. IV-A, inference is a straightforward (and practically
trivial) consequence of the process and data decomposition.
The essence of deriving claim HI is in the FHA decomposition,
and each step of such decomposition is to be justified and
assured to be semantically sound in the following sense: if all
subprocesses Pi of a process P are well done, then the process
P is well done.
The decomposition we are discussing can well be phrased
in terms of goal decomposition: To assure that the system is
safe (SS or G1, see Fig. 12), identify all hazards (HI or A1)
and protect the system against each hazard (HP or G2). To
identify all hazards (HI), do the FHA in the following way
.... (see the above). To protect the system against each hazard
(HP), make sure that all identified hazards are covered (HC),
and each beingCovered relationship is verified and validated
(CV). To ensure each hazard has been covered, make sure
that apportionment is done well (A) and all hazard groups
are covered (GP), and so on. Thus, what is shown in Fig. 12
as inference, is actually nothing but goal decomposition or,
technically, a SEP decomposition into FHA and HP (hazard
protection subbranch), followed by HP’s further decomposi-
tion into HC and CV, and so on as shown in Fig. 12 or in more
detail in Fig. 8 (p.10). Phrasing this decomposition in logical
terms (CAE) can be misleading as it creates an impression of
a “proof” that decomposition is done right (Fig. 12), while
actually such a “proof” is missing from Fig. 12.
Indeed, how do we know that if i) all hazards are identified
and ii) the system is protected against each identified hazard,
then the system is safe? In the logical sense, this is just a
tautology: if a hazard is something that can make a system
unsafe, then the system is, by definition, safe iff it is protected
against all hazards. Other inference steps in Fig. 12 are also
mainly tautological if considered in a purely logical way
because they contain not only syntactic verification (which is
formal and thus indeed logically inferential), but also semantic
validation part. For example, the syntactic part of claim HC
(i.e., the multiplicity 1 of association ’protectedBy’) can be
formally derived from the syntactic parts of claims A and GP
(which are multiplicites 1 of their corresponding associations
traced by dashed ornage lines) based on the equality (2) on
p.12—this is a logical inference step, but it is very simple. As
for the semantic part, we need either to postulate a definition
that HC is A & GP (which makes the inference HC ⇐
A & GP trivial), or to consider HC as being semantically
different from A & GP and thus making the inference step
HC⇐ A & GP semantically non-trivial and hence requiring a
justification. The latter would refer to previous experience and
expert opinion that the process of covering hazards by doing,
first, their apportionment/grouping, which is then followed
by designing protection system for each group, is a reliable
pattern that ensures hazard coverage (claim HC) if the two
subprocesses are properly executed. Similarly, if we do not
want to consider the final inference SS⇐HI & HP as being
merely a definition of hazards, we need to reformulate it as a
claim about SEP decomposition: if the processes FHA and HP
(system protection against all identified hazards) were properly
done, then the system is safe. Clearly, semantic validity of such
a claim needs a special justification, which is typically missing
from safety cases employing this pattern.
B. WF+ vs. GSN.
We do not think that the goal of a GSN inference tree
is to demonstrate trivial tautologies, and there should be a
real content behind the inference steps. As our discussion
above shows, this real content consists of claims about process
decomposition – each inference step is a decomposition step,
so that the entire inference tree amounts to justifying the SEP
definition. In other words, the actual goal of the blue part of
Fig. 12 is to ensure the SEP definition given by Fig. 8. To
achieve this goal, each decomposition/inference step should
be provided by a justification assuring the semantic validity
of the step, and we come to item a) in our general definition
of safety Def. 1, which so far was largely ignored in our
discussion. Importantly, the WF+ formalism per se, including
its formal constraint derivation, does not address the issue we
are discussing, and the term WF+ in the title of this subsection
refers to the entire approach to assurance we describe in this
report rather than to a special type of workflow modelling.
A major question we are discussing is this: Why Wf SEP,
if properly executed for a system X , results in a system
X with required critical properties, and the WF+-approach
offers the following generic answer. A proper execution of
Wf exeSEP(X) results in a system X with the required critical
properties because: a) the SEP definition is based on a col-
lective experience in dealing with systems similar to X; b)
all novelties brought by X were analyzed by experts and
addressed according to general patterns of addressing such
novelties, and the SEP definition was appropriately amended;
c) other arguments justifying that the SEP satisfies its required
critical properties. Our formulations have a large room for
improvement and accuracy, we give them just to show the
nature of the required arguments.
In the WF+, assurance conditions such as a,b,c above,
are subsumed by an appropriately defined notion of con-
formance of the SEP definition workflow Wf SEP to some
virtual workflow Wf Norm, which models and integrates the
set of all relevant normative and guiding (formal and informal)
documents into a workflow Wf Norm (the next section provides
some detail). Thus, Parts 1 and 1* of a generic safety case can
be combined into
Part 1+: Assuring that the SEP is properly defined by
showing its conformance (as a workflow Wf SEP) to some
normative workflow Wf Norm (both are actually WF
+-objects).
In general, this conformance can be managed similarly to
the instance conformance we considered in this report (Sect.
3-4). The next section provides some details.
C. Conformance to Normative doc
1) The Normative Document: The main question above is
also discussed in paper [11], which outlines how the issue is
addressed in the classical engineering domains. Similar to our
requirement R6, one of their main points is that sufficiently
prescriptive guidelines based on established foundations (we
say ‘normative documents’) for the devlopment of safety-
critical systems must be provided to ensure their safety.
However, the question of whether the SEP definition conforms
to the corresponding established foundations/normative docs is
far non-trivial. Traditionally, the latter are written in natural
languages, contain many cross referenced sections, subsec-
tions, tables, etc., and their full understanding can require a
huge amount of time and efforts. Moreover, even full under-
standing of a standard (such as ISO 26262) does not guarantee
its uniqueness because of ambiguities inherent in natural
language formulations and possibly different backgrounds of
the standard writers and the standard readers.
In WF+, we propose to model the integrity of normative
documents (domain-specific standards, internal company pro-
cedures, legal requirements) as a metamodel Wf Norm to guide
the development of a Wf SEP and, moreover, to provide a
definitive second layer of assurance by checking conformance
Wf SEP ref Wf Norm (see item a) in Def. 2). A manufacturer
would develop their Wf SEP by refining a very abstract Wf Norm
to the point that it can be executed. Through conformance
to Wf Norm, a manufacturer can be sure that they satisfy all
prescriptive guidelines and thus gain confidence in the safety
of their system (as long as Wf Norm is reliable indeed).
Similarly to the instance-metamodel conformance, the re-
finement conformance also has two components: syntactic
and semantic. Syntactic conformance is shown by demon-
strating that a SEP metamodel is indeed a refinement of
the normative metamodel in some formal sense. Semantic
conformance should validate that the SEP satisfies the intent of
the normative metamodel, and is much more challenging. We
propose to address it similarly to the issue of SEP execution
validity, i.e., by reviewing: each piece of the SEP definition
should be checked for conformance to the normative docs and
then reviewed.
From an MDE perspective, replacing the traditional ap-
proach with a model-based WF+ could provide the following
benefits: a) it avoids the ambiguity of natural language; b)
it improves understandability by providing explicit process
flow, dataflow, and constraints; c) it presents information more
intuitively by utilizing the workflow notations.
Remark 1 (Multiple Normative Documents): Manufacturers
normally must conform to many domain-specific standards,
internal company procedures, legal requirements, and other
normative documents. These standards are often interrelated,
overlap and can even be contradictory. The WF+-approach
models this as a single virtual workflow Wf Norm defined as an
imaginary merge of the components, in which discrepancies
are reconciled. Implementation of such a merge requires an
accurate specification of all complex relationships between
normative documents, and the corresponding tool support for
model matching and merging.
Remark 2 (Deeper justification): As explained in Sect. IV,
establishing the soundness of an argument may be difficult.
While an instance must only demonstrate conformance to
its SEP, and an SEP must only demonstrate conformance
to its normative documents/workflow, the latter must also
be justified somehow. This justification can be interpreted
as yet another one conformance mapping to a system of
informal elements based on experience, empirical evidence,
best practices, and patterns.
VII. TOWARDS A UML PROFILE FOR WF+ MODELLING
1) The meta-metamodel.: The WF+-models we used in the
paper are encoded as UML class diagrams of a special type.
Special features of this type are
1) Two types of classes: process classes and data classes
2) Two types of associations:
a) dataflow associations from data to process classes and
back
b) static data associations from data to data classes.
Specifically, there are associations from the output data
of a process to its input data – this is the essence of
WF+.
3) Special process class: Reviewing. Each data elements is
supplied with mandatory validity checking. The latter is
realized as a cross-cutting concern (a.k.a as an aspect),
i.e., a metamodel fragment attached to the main meta-
model at a specified point as explain in Sect.3.4
4) Several constraints regulating the interaction above. The
most important one is that the process classes and their
dataflow form an hierarchy (a directed acyclic graph
without looping, DAG); note that looping mentioned in
1b is purely static!
Technically, the requirements above can be implemented as
a UML profile, or a domain specific language. A high-level
meta-metamodel for this profile is shown in Fig. 15.
2) WF+ Design.: WF+-design methodology,as any design
methodology, is difficult to formalize, but we have found
several patterns demonstrated in Sect.3. We start with a GSN
case and convert it into a WF+ by following the following
steps.
1) Label the GSN diagram with processes involved (green
labels in Fig.4) The SEP-logic may require adding new
(sub)processes.
Figure 14. A sample normative document fragment
Figure 15. Metamodel for WF+
2) Discover the dataflow of the processes identified in 1 (the
yellow and grey labels in Fig.4).
3) Identify claims and model them as constraints with
Boolean truth-values (red labels).
4) Supply each data associations with a reviewing block
(violet circles in Fig.6) thus converting fundamental va-
lidity requirements of a principally semantic nature into
syntactical constraints.
5) Add logical claim inference – blue blocks and blue arrows
in Fig.7.
3) Model management.: There are two special requirements
to a model management engine to handle WF+-models.
1) To execute aspect weaving, i.e., be able to add the
reviewing metamodel to the main metamodel at any
specified point.
2) To have a special query interface for the special structure
of the metamodel, e.g., build the control flow view
of a WF+-model (by transitive closure of the In-Out
relationships), or build a data dependency graph w.r.t. the
dataflow embodied into the WF+-model.
VIII. APPLICABILITY AND POSSIBLE IMPACT OF WF+
We have analyzed seven major issues with SCs identified in
a survey on SCs used in practice [12]. These issues correspond
well with our own experience of SCs in industryand overlap
with our requirements described on p.1. Below, for each issue
we provide its italicized summary(and refer to our similar
requirements), followed by the applicability of WF+ in
corroborating and/or addressing the issue, followed by GSN’s
inability to manage (or, worse, its ability to create) the issue.
1) Scalability Navigation and comprehension of the SC is difficult.
Current tools either fail to deliver features to handle scalability, or
are domain-specific and not generalizable. (Plus R4, R5)
WF+ : a) All traceability is explicit and extends into the
development process, the product artifacts and even the envi-
ronment, thereby improving detailed understandability, b) The
framework is model-based and allows for compositionality and
hence decomposition and modularization and so, in spite of
the complexity of the system and its trace-links, there are built
in constructs for managing this.
GSN: SCs are difficult to comprehend due to the amount of
implicit information and their ad hoc structure that is evident
even in simple SCs (see Fig. 7); for large industrial SCs, these
deficiencies can accumulate enormously and really prevent
understanding.
2) Managing Change There are no effective mechanisms to man-
age changes in SCs. Lack of integration of processes and inadequate
tool support are contributing factors. (R1, R2, R5)
WF+ : The SEP and SC meta-models are integrated. We thus
have complete traceability between model elements, explicit
dataflow and explicit process flow, all of which are crucial for
impact analysis and change management. A strict separation
of instance and meta-levels of modelling provides a convenient
reusability mechanism.
GSN: Traceability is almost entirely omitted, making change
management a very difficult task. The GSN SC appears as
entity separate from the SEP and other product artifacts.
3) Requiring special skills to create Graphic notations of SCs
are intuitive to understand, but creating a well-structured, convincing
SC requires special skills/experience. The privacy of information in
SCs prevents the sharing of knowledge on effective patterns and
strategies. (R3: a unified approach reduces the need for special
skills.)
WF+ : a) Workflows are a natural way for engineers to
understand their work. As a result, WF+ provides an intuitive
and easily understandable framework for building SCs. b)
A strict separation of instance and meta- (and metameta-)
levels of modelling allows experts to create templates and
share effective patterns and strategies (with a reduced fear of
revealing sensitive information about products).
GSN: For engineers, it is difficult to convert their intuitive
understanding of the story of a system’s safety into the one-
dimensional structure of GSN-style safety cases.
4) Complexity of the system Identifying safety concerns is ex-
tremely difficult in complex systems due to the difficulty of managing
and identifying interactions between different subsystems. Multidis-
ciplinary collaboration is also challenging. (R2, R4, R5)
Complexity. WF+ : a) Traceability does help to identify inter-
actions. b) Compositionality of WF+ allows for decomposition
a classical engineering approach to manage complexity.
GSN:The absence of traceability links makes interaction anal-
ysis very difficult unless the SC assessor has been deeply
involved in the creation of this system. But then the assessment
can suffer from confirmation bias.
Collaboration. WF+ : An intuitive common language allows
experts to share different perspectives and facilitate discussions
GSN: Ad-hoc structure and implicit information leaves room
for ambiguity, potentially impeding communication between
teams.
5) Uncertainty, trust, confidence Issues of confidence and trust
are seen as intangible. This leaves room for doubt about the efficacy
of SCs and makes it difficult to establish trust. (R3, R4, R6)
Confidence and trust are notoriously difficult to quantify in the
context of assurance, and have long been a topic of debate [20].
WF+ : a) Conformance of the SEP-definition to normative
documents makes a “half” of the framework and thus directly
addresses the issues above. b) Creating data-driven argument
flow in WF+ is difficult, but if managed, it provides a high
level of confidence as it is explicit and formalized.
GSN: The ability of manufacturers to generate trust in their
safety cases is dependent upon their ability to express what has
been done to reviewers. GSN-style SCs provide little support
for this as they leave massive arrays of data, process and
dataflow details implicit.
6) Too flexible Flexibility can be dangerous because manufacturers
can overlook aspects of safety. Conflicts of interest and confirmation
bias contribute to this danger. This is closely related to establishing
trust and confidence. (R6)
Independent assessment has been shown to be effective in
reducing confirmation bias [21]. WF+ : A well-defined struc-
ture for SCs and the ability to offer templates to guide their
development, allowing assessors to gain expertise in evaluating
SCs.
GSN: The ad-hoc structure of GSN-style safety cases makes
it very difficult to develop expertise in analyzing these safety
cases, making it far too likely that holes in arguments will go
unnoticed.
7) Incomplete information Survey: Limited integration of SC
management into the software development process causes challenges
in collecting sufficient and accurate information for safety arguments.
Incomplete traceability, insufficiencies in testing and flawed safety
requirements are all issues that arise as a result of this. (R3, R4,
R5)
WF+ : Processes and complete traceability between data are
incorporated. This enables integration of the Design and SEP
and SC development, allowing for systematic change impact
analysis and, with proper tooling, automated updating of SCs
in response to changes in data and gathering of data, ensuring
information is properly managed.
GSN: a) GSN-style safety cases argue over instance-level data.
The notion of processes flow and dataflow are omitted almost
entirely. b) Implicit traceability leaves room for data to be left
behind or forgotten.
IX. RELATED WORK
A series of seminal papers [22]–[24] introduced the ideas
of metamodeling and model management into assurance, but
their main focus was on data conformance rather than dataflow.
Dataflow was the focus in [14] but they do not consider the
argument flow, and focus on process decomposition rather
than on SCs. Analysis of GSN-based SCs has an extensive
literature, but it is mainly focused on the logic than the
dataflow (see a survey in [19]). Several ways of formalizing
SCs were suggested by Rushby in [25], but his focus is more
on the argument structure. Tooling for GSN-based SCs is
discussed in [3]
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Figure 16.
WF+ has its origin in block
diagrams (as a networking
mechanism) and model trans-
formations as processes over
GBOO data, but differs from
both of them as illustrated by
the schema in Fig. 16. Model
refinement [26] and process re-
finement [?] have extensive lit-
erature, but we have not found
yet the notion most suitable for our needs to model confor-
mance to the normative documents.
X. CONCLUSION
We have shown that GSN-style safety cases suffer from two
inherent drawbacks. The first, technical, is implicitness and
incompleteness of the dataflow and traceability in the GSN-
structured safety cases (see Sect. 5). The second, conceptual,
is the absence of assuring the SEP definition, which is an
important constituent of safety assurance (Sect. 6). The worst
feature of GSN safety cases is that they fake logical inference
and thus create a false sense of confidence that safety had been
demonstrated acceptably well.
We have presented WF+ as a modelling framework which
meets the core needs of creating, documenting and manag-
ing safety cases. Precise dataflow modelling, the benefits of
the traceability inherent in the UML class modelling, the
intuitive understandability of workflows, and a well-founded
approach to developing assurance claims modelled by OCL
constraints over a SEP metamodel, result in an approach that
integrates processes, product and safety cases. This integration
is both conceptual and technical—the latter is based on explicit
traceability links relating all constituents that matter in the
SEP. This comprehensive traceability is crucial in consistency
management, in which we strive to maintain consistency
between the various artifacts within all the associated models.
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